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The components of suicide assessments, empirically supported treatments, and ethical and legal issues that may arise are reviewed. Vignettes, role play exercises, quizzes, and case studies engage readers to enhance learning. Intended for graduate and advanced undergraduate courses in suicide assessment and prevention, crisis intervention, crisis counseling or assessment, or advanced techniques taught in social work, counseling, psychology, public health, nursing, and medicine, this book is also appropriate for mental health and health professionals in these areas. Dana Alonzo, PhD, LCSW is an Associate Professor at Fordham University Graduate School of Social Service and a Founder and Director of the Suicide Prevention Research Program. She has many years of clinical experience working with individuals with suicidality in a variety of settings. Dr. Jack Leiss and David Savitz reported in the 1995 American Journal of Public Health of several studies showing pesticide exposure increases risks for childhood cancer. This included one study which found over twice the risk of brain cancer for children exposed to household insecticide extermination. Also reported was research by Dr. Ellen Davis of children with brain cancer under 10 years of age. This study found children with brain cancer had 6.
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Article I, Section 9 is the first of the no, and it has to do with the slaves who were listening. Stay tuned Americans to the Hugh Hewitt Show. Welcome back, America. I'm Hugh Hewitt with Dr. Larry Arnn, president of Hillsdale College, All Things Hillsdale, including an application to attend this overwhelmingly popular now institution are available at Hillsdale. edu.
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Companies having these types of derivative instruments are free to develop and use discretionary valuation models based on their own assumptions and methods. The Financial Accounting Standards Boards FASB emerging issues task force has debated the subject of how to value and disclose energy related contracts for several years. It has been able to conclude only that a one size fits all approach will not work and that to require companies to disclose all of the assumptions and estimates underlying earnings would produce disclosures that were so voluminous they would be of little value. For a company such as Enron, under continuous pressure to beat earnings estimates, it is possible that valuation estimates might have considerably overstated earnings. Furthermore, unrealized trading gains accounted for slightly more than half of the companys $1. 41 billion reported pretax profit for 2000 and about one third of its reported pretax profit for 1999. In the latter part of the 1990s, companies such as Dynegy, Duke Energy, El Paso and Williams began following Enrons lead. Enrons competitive advantage, as well as its huge profit margins, had begun to erode by the end of 2000. Each new market entrants successes squeezed Enrons profit margins further. It ran with increasing leverage, thus becoming more like a hedge fund than a trading company. Meanwhile, energy prices began to fall in the first quarter of 2001 and the world economy headed into a recession, thus dampening energy market volatility and reducing the opportunity for the large, rapid trading gains that had formerly made Enron so profitable. Deals, especially in the finance division, were done at a rapid pace without much regard to whether they aligned with the strategic goals of the company or whether they complied with the companys risk management policies. As one knowledgeable Enron employee put it: Good deal vs. bad deal?Didnt matter. If it had a positive net present value NPV it could get done. Sometimes positive NPV didnt even matter in the name of strategic significance. Enrons foundations were developing cracks and Skillings house of paper built on the stilts of trust had begun to crumble. In order to satisfy Moodys and Standard and Poors credit rating agencies, Enron had to make sure the companys leverage ratios were within acceptable ranges. Fastow continually lobbied the ratings agencies to raise Enrons credit rating, apparently to no avail. That notwithstanding, there were other ways to lower the companys debt ratio. Reducing hard assets while earning increasing paper profits served to increase Enrons return on assets ROA and reduce its debt to total assets ratio, making the company more attractive to credit rating agencies and investors. Enron, like many other companies, used special purpose entities SPEs to access capital or hedge risk. By using SPEs such as limited partnerships with outside parties, a company is permitted to increase leverage and ROA without having to report debt on its balance sheet. The company contributes hard assets and related debt to an SPE in exchange for an interest. The SPE then borrows large sums of money from a financial institution to purchase assets or conduct other business without the debt or assets showing up on the companys financial statements. The company can also sell leveraged assets to the SPE and book a profit. To avoid classification of the SPE as a subsidiary thereby forcing the entity to include the SPEs financial position and results of operations in its financial statements, FASB guidelines require that only 3% of the SPE be owned by an outside investor. Under Fastows leadership, Enron took the use of SPEs to new heights of complexity and sophistication, capitalizing them with not only a variety of hard assets and liabilities, but also extremely complex derivative financial instruments, its own restricted stock, rights to acquire its stock and related liabilities. As its financial dealings became more complicated, the company apparently also used SPEs to park troubled assets that were falling in value, such as certain overseas energy facilities, the broadband operation or stock in companies that had been spun off to the public. Transferring these assets to SPEs meant their losses would be kept off Enrons books. To compensate partnership investors for downside risk, Enron promised issuance of additional shares of its stock. As the value of the assets in these partnerships fell, Enron began to incur larger and larger obligations to issue its own stock later down the road. Compounding the problem toward the end was the precipitous fall in the value of Enron stock. Enron conducted business through thousands of SPEs. The most controversial of them were LJM Cayman LP and LJM2 Co Investment LP, run by Fastow himself. From 1999 through July 2001, these entities paid Fastow more than $30 million in management fees, far more than his Enron salary, supposedly with the approval of top management and Enrons board of directors.